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NOTES
THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR IN LAW
INTRODUCTION
With the entrance of the United States into the present War
the position of the conscientious objector in the law once again
needs clarification. It is the purpose of this note to show the
historical development of this exemption from military service,
and to explore the legal aspects of the status of conscientious
objector.
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
. Conscription Generally
As early as 1777 Virginia passed an act providing that if a
certain number of men were not raised for the continental army
by a certain date, there should be a draft from the militia.' This
act was never attacked in the courts. The Constitution of the
United States gives Congress the power to "raise and support
armies, ' '2 but the Second Amendment recognizes the right of the
states to a "well-regulated militia."s Pursuant to this grant the
states have constitutional provisions providing for an active state
militia of a voluntary nature, but reserving the right, by placing
every citizen in the militia, to call any or all of them if needed.4
1. 9 Hen. Stat. at Large, 275 and 337; 10 Hen. Stat. at Large, 82, 214,
259, 838; 11 Hen. Stat. at Large, 14.
2. U. S. Const. (1787) Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12.
8. U. S. Const. (1787) Amend. II; see also Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 16.
4. Ala. Const. (1901) Art. XV, sec. 271; Ariz. Const. (1912) Art. XVI,
sec. 1; Ark. Const. (1874) Art. XI, see. 1; Colo. Const. (1876) Art. XVII,
sec. 1; Fla. Const. (1887) Art. XIV, sec. 1; Ga. Const. (1877) Art. X,
sec. 1, par. 1; Idaho Const. (1890) Art. XIV, sec. 1; Ill. Const. (1870)
Art. XII, sec. 6; Ind. Const. (1851) Art. XII, sec. 6; Iowa Const. (1857)
Art. VI, sec. 2; Kan. Const. (1861) Art. VIII, sec. 1; Ky. Const. (1891)
sec. 220; Me. Const. (1876) Art. VII, sec. 5; Md. Const. (1867) Art. IX,
sec. 1; Mich. Const. (1908) Art. XV, sec. 1; Miss. Const. (1890) Art. IX,
sec. 1; Mo. Const. (1875) Art. XIII, sec. 1; Mont. Const. (1889) Art. XIV,
sec. 1; Neb. Const. (1875) Art. XIV, sec. 1; N. Hamp. Const. (1784) Part I,
Art. 13; Nev. Const. (1926) Art. XII, sec. 156; N. C. Const. (1876) Art
XII, sec. 1; N. D. Const. (1889) Art. XIII, sec. 188; Ore. Const. (1859)
Art. X, sec. 2; S. C. Const. (1895) Art. XIII, sec. 1; S. D. Const.
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During the Civil War the muster of troops into the state militia
was held to be subordinate to the federal calls, since every citizen
was constructively in the federal army, and therefore that army's
service commanded priority.5 Since the Civil War the importance
of the state militia as a fighting force separate from the United
States Army has decreased, but most of these state statutory and
constitutional provisions remain.
During the Civil War both the United States" and the Con-
federate7 Governments passed conscription acts. These acts were
attacked several times in the courts, but they were uniformly
held to be a valid exercise of the power to "raise armies."8 Again
during the last War 9 and after the passage of the present Con-
scription Act 0 attempts have been made to deny the power of
conscription to Congress, -but all have failed. The grounds for
attack have generally been that the power of conscription is not
included in the power to "raise armies," or that it violates the
provisions of the Constitution against slavery or involuntary
servitude.
The power of conscription probably goes further than any of
these acts. In a Civil War case, Parker v. Kaughmcan," the power
to draft labor for the armed services was held to be included in
the power of general conscription. That case involved a baker
who claimed that since he was exempt from active duty, he could
not be called to bake in an army kitchen. The court held that
there is no invariable rule for the construction of an army, and
that the power to draft this man as a baker existed in the power
to "raise armies." It now seems entirely possible that Congress
can conscript labor not only for the armed forces, but for muni-
tions and other war work as well. And there is language in a
recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
saying that Congress may conscript industry.2
(1889) Art. XV, sec. 7; Tenn. Const. (1870) Art. I, see. 28; Tex. Const.
(1876) Art. XVI, sec. 47; Vt. Const. (1793) Chap. I, Art. 9; Wash. Const.
(1889) Art. X, sec. 6; Wyo. Const (1889) Art. XVII, sec. 1.
5. The State, ex rel. Graham, In re Emerson (1864) 39 Ala. 437.
6. (1863) 12 Stat. 731, c. 75.
7. Matthews, Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America,
(1st Congress, 1st Session, 1862) 29.
8. Jeffers v. Fair (1862) 33 Ga. 347; Kneedler v. Lane (1863) 45 Pa.
238; Ex parte Coupland (1862) 26 Tex. 387; Burroughs v. Peyton (1864)
16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 470.
9. Selective Draft Law Cases (1918) 245 U. S. 366; Claudius v. Davie
(1917) 175 Cal. 208, 165 Pac. 689.
10. United States v. Lambert (C. C. A. Pa. 1942) 123 F. (2d) 395;
United States v. Rappeport (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 915.
11. (1865) 34 Ga. 136.
12. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation (1942) 62 S. Ct. 581,
590; 86 L. Ed. 521, 529; see also (1940) 54 Stat. 892, c. 720, see. 9, 50
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II. Conscientious Objectors
The state constitutions generally grant to the legislature the
power to exempt conscientious objectors,1 3 but some specifically
exempt them in time of peace--generally on condition that pay-
ment of an equivalent for military service be made," and a few
grant exemption in time of war as well.15 Generally these con-
stitutional provisions define a conscientious objector as a member
of a recognized religious sect whose tenets condemn war,' 6 but
a few allow the broader definition of anyone having conscientious
scruples against war.1
Pursuant to these constitutional provisions most states have
passed statutes making provision for exemption of conscientious
objectors. In these statutes the legislatures have tended to re-
strict the definition of conscientious objection, making it re-
ligious only,18 and to restrict the exemption itself, by requiring
the objector to perform non-combatant service when called
upon.' 9
During the Civil War the conscription statute of the United
States" did.not provide for exemption because of conscientious
objection, but perhaps it was felt that the provision for sending
a substitute would avoid any difficulty on this score.2 ' At any
APp. U. S. C. A. see. 309, a statute empowering the President of the
United States to conscript industry.
18. Ala. Const. (1901) Art. XV, sec. 271; Ari7. Const. (1912) Art. XVI,
sec. 1; Ark. Const. (1874) Art. XI, see. 1; Colo. Const. (1876) Art. XVII,
see. 1; Ga. Const. (1877) Art. X, see. 1, par. 1; Kan. Const. (1861) Art.
VIII, see. 1; Ky. Const. (1891) see. 220; Me. Const. (1876) Art. VII, sec.
5; Mich. Const. (1908) Art. XV, see. 1; Mont. Const. (1889) Art. XIV,
see. 1; Ne. Const. (1875) Art. XIV, see. 1; Nev. Const. (1926) Art. XII,
see. 1; Wyo. Const. (1889) Art. XVII, see. 1.
14. Idaho Const. (1890) Art. XIV, see. 1; II. Const. (1870) Art. XII,
se. 6; Iowa Const. (1857) Art. VI, sec. 2; N. D. Const. (1889) Art.
XIII, see. 188; Ore. Const. (1859) Art. X, see. 2; S. D. Const. (1889)
Art. XV, sec. 7.
15. Ind. Const. (1851) Art. XII, sec. 6; Mo. Const. (1875) Art. XIII,
see. 1; N. Ramp. Const. (1784) Part I, Art. 13; N. C. Const. (1876)
Art. XII, sec. 1; S. C. Const. (1895) Art. XIII, sec. 1; Tenn. Const.
(1870) Art. I, sec. 28; Tex. Const. (1876) Art. XVI, see. 47; Vt. Const.
(1798) Chap. I, Art. 9; Wash. Const. (1889) Art. X, sec. 6.
16. Me. Const. (1876) Art. VII, see. 5.
17. S. C. Const. (1895) Art. XIII, see. 1.,
18. Kans. Gen. Stat. (1935) see. 48-102; 1 Ann. Laws of Mass. (1932)
a. 33, sec. 4 [this provision omitted, (1939) c. 33]; Ore. Code (1930) see.
52-105.
19. Ala. Code (1932 Supp.) sec. 1600 (81); Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws
(1927) sec. 2016; Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1936) see. 2711a-146; Dart's La.
Stat. (1989) sec. 4507; Rev. Stat. N. J. (1937) 38: 1-2; N. C. Code
(1935) see. 6795; Throckmorton's Ohio Code Ann. (1940) see. 5177; Ore.
Code (1930) see. 52-105.
20. (1868) 12 Stat. 731, c. 75.
21. Ibid., see. 13.
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rate no cases seem to have arisen involving persons with an
objection to war. In the Confederate States, however, while the
conscription statute22 provided for sending substitutes, members
of specified religious sects were granted exemption, if they
furnished substitutes or paid $500.23 This was the first "federal"
recognition of this belief.
The Selective Service Act of 191724 allowed exemption from
combatant duty to conscientious objectors, but restricted the
definition to members of "any well-recognized religious sect or
organization at present organized and existing * * * ,,22 These
individuals were subject to non-combatant duty.
The Selective Service Act of 194026 contains the most liberal
provision of all. It allows exemption not only to members of
religious organizations opposed to war, but also to individuals
who have conscientious scruples against war, and under it these
persons may apply either for non-combatant duty,27 or assign-
ment to "work of national importance under civilian direction.1 28
The differences between the Act of 1917 and the Act of 1940 are
readily apparent: the 1940 Act contains a broader definition of
a conscientious objector and provides for a specialized exemption
from military service entirely. The latter as worked out in prac-
tice consists of sending the objector to camps where work similar
to that of the Civilian Conservation Corps is done. However, the
payment of approximately thirty-five dollars per month for the
22. Matthews, Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America
(1st Congress, 2d session, 1862) 77, 78.
23. Under this act were exempted " * * * all persons who have been
and now are members of the society of Friends and the association of
Dunkards, Nazarenes and Mennonists, in regular membership in their re-
spective denominations: Provided, Members of the society of Friends,
Nazarenes, Mennonists and Dunkards shall furnish substitutes or pay a
tax of $500 each into the public treasury."
24. 40 Stat. 76, c. 15.
25. Ibid., sec. 4.
26. 54 Stat. 885, c. 720; 50 App. U. S. C. A. sec. 305.
27. What is non-combatant duty? According to a War Department
Public Relations Release dated Jan. 18, 1941, non-combatant conscientious
objectors may be assigned to the following fields: any unit of the Medical
Department; any unit of the Quartermaster Corps except those organically
assigned to divisions or smaller units; decontamination companies only of
the Chemical Warfare Service; construction units, photographic units, depot
units, repair units, or pigeon units of the Signal Corps; any unit of the
Corps of Engineers except combat units, general service units, separate
battalions, pontoon battalions; any units or installation of Corps Area
Service Commands or War Department Overhead except Replacement Center
units of the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, Air
Corps, Ordnance Department, Armored Force, and Military Police Units.
(C. C. H., War Law Service, sec. 18,804.)
28. 54 Stat. 885, c. 720, sec. 5(g); 50 App. U. S. C. A. sec. 305.
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cost of maintenance in the camps is required of the individual.
Thus it may deprive some of the privilege of claiming conscien-
tious objection because of the monetary consideration involved,
but nevertheless it is a very liberal provision.
2 9
JUDICIAL APPROACH
It can be seen from the above analysis of the constitutional
and statutory history of conscientious objectors that the legis-
latures have been granted and have exercised a wide discretion
with regard to them. The legislatures have restricted, however,
the objector's "rights" to a varying degree. But one way or an-
other a conscientious objector has always had some opportunity
to be relieved of military service, either because that service was
voluntary or because there was some procedure to allow him
exemption, if he proved his "right" to exemption. The courts
have, by judicial interpretation, further restricted that "right."
The premise of the courts has been the rule that "It is the
duty of every citizen to bear arms when called upon to do so."
Since this duty is universal, the courts argue, any exemption
from it amounts to a privilege, determinable by the legislature in
29. The procedure to be followed under the 1940 Act by one claiming
to be a conscientious objector is interesting. As explained in a Department
of Justice Release, May 6, 1941 (C. C. H., War Law Service, sec. 18,810),
the registrant asking for exemption must first apply to his local draft board.
If that board does not grant him exemption, he may appeal to the District
Board, which follows a specialized procedure. This procedure involves six
steps: 1) the Appeal Board transmits the case to the United States Attor-
ney in the District; 2) the United States Attorney gives the case to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, if he thinks that the Bureau has juris-
diction; 8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation makes an investigation and
report, which it transmits to the United States Attorney, who in turn passes
it to the local Hearing Officer; 4) the Hearing Officer fixes a time and place
for a hearing; 5) after the hearing, the Hearing Officer makes a report
to the Department of Justice consisting of, a) a statement of the findings
of fact which he made, and, b) his recommendation for disposal of the
case; 6) the Department of Justice then transmits its recommendation to
the Appeal Board for disposition. It will be seen at once that this proce-
dure involves discretion in many places, and that the registrants will have
little to say in the result. But it must be remembered that conscientious
objection is not measurable by a rigid set of standards, as other grounds for
exemption are. It is a mental state which is difficult of ascertainment, and
is susceptible to abuse, and therefore should be carefully considered.
30. In United States v. Schwimmer (1929) 279 U. S. 644, the Court said
emphatically at page 650, " * * * it is the duty of citizens by force of
arms to defend our government against all enemies whenever necessity
arises;" and in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1904) 197 U. S. 11, the Court
said (page 29), " * * * and yet he [the citizen] may be compelled, by force
if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or
his peculiar interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take
his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense."
1942] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
570 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
any way, and revocable at will. Since its control is in the hands
of the legislature, and that body sets up its administration, the
courts will do little to interfere with the expression of the legis-
lative fiat. And since the nature of the draft procedure is ad-
ministrative, the long-established rule applies that courts will
not investigate a hearing before an administrative tribunal other
than to determine the tribunal had jurisdiction and that there
was a fair hearing.
Some examples of the seeming antipathy of the courts toward
conscientious objectors may be noted in the decided cases. These
cases fall into three classifications: naturalization, student, and
conscription cases.
I. Naturalization Cases
The importance of the naturalization cases, United States v.
Schwimmer" and United States v. Macintosh,32 in regard to con-
scientious objectors to war and their exemption from military
service lies in the fact that they did not involve administrative
law technicalities, and that both had a clear set of facts.
The Schwimmer case, decided in 1929, near the height of the
pacifistic feeling which swept the United States between the last
War and the present conflict, is a good example. In the natural-
ization proceeding, one of the things to be done by the applicant
for citizenship is the filling out of a questionnaire. In accordance
with that part of the Naturalization Act of 1906 3 which reads,
He [the applicant] shall * * * declare on oath * * * that he
will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and
bear true faith and allegiance to the same,
the naturalization officials had placed on the questionnaire a
question reading, "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms
in defense of this country?" Rosika Schwimmer, the applicant,
answered this question, "I would not take up arms personally."
When asked to expand this answer, she said she was an uncom-
promising pacifist, that she had no nationalist sense, only a
"cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family." In
spite of her sex and the probability that she would never be
asked or required to bear arms, the Court denied citizenship to
her. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented vigorously, Justice
Holmes saying that she should not be denied citizenship merely
31. (1929) 279 U. S. 644.
32. (1931) 283 U. S. 605.
33. 34 Stat. 596, c. 3592, sec. 4(3); U. S. C. Tit. 8, sec. 381.
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because she believed "more than some of us do in the teachings
of the Sermon on the Mount."t
3 4
The Maxintosh case was a more bitterly fought decision. Here,
under similar circumstances, was a Canadian Baptist Minister
seeking naturalization. He was a professor of divinity at Yale
University, of great intellectual repute, and was over the mili-
tary age when he answered the same question Mrs. Schwimmer
had been asked, "Yes, but I should want to be free to judge of
the necessity." Here, too, the Court denied citizenship to the
applicant. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone concurred in a
dissent written by Justice Hughes.
Both of these cases can be justified under the law, in view of
the plenary power of Congress over aliens. If Congress desired
every alien seeking naturalization to take an oath to bear arms
if necessary, there is no doubt that it had the power to do so.
The Court merely decided that Congress had shown such a desire.
A conditional citizenship is infeasible from a political science
viewpoint, and if it is a duty of every citizen to bear arms when
called upon, these applicants could not logically be admitted on
the limited, qualified or conditional basis that they should not
have to bcar arms if called upon-this may be another explana-
tion of the cases. But under the facts of each case it might be
urged that Congress had not expressed a desire that all appli-
cants for citizenship take such an oath, and that these applicants
were not seeking conditional citizenship, but rather the rights of
ordinary citizens of the United States, who have the "privilege"
of conscientious objection, but not the "right."31 It should be
noted that in both cases distinguished Justices dissented, the
gist of their arguments being essentially what is outlined above,
indicating that the cases were not, perhaps, incontrovertible6
34. 279 U. S. 644, 655.
85. There is a clear expression of this in United States v. Macintosh
(1981) 283 U. S. 605, on page 624, "The privilege of the native-born con-
scientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the Constitution,
but from the acts of Congress." The Georgia court made two nice expres-
&ions of this idea during the Civil War. In Daly v. Harris (1864) 33 Ga.
(Supp.) 38 the court said that exemption is not a right vested by contract,
which Congress may not violate or impair, but such exemption is a gratui-
tous privilege, revocable at the will of the legislature that granted it. In
Barber v. Irwin (1864) 34 Ga. 27 the court said (and it applies very well
to similar remarks in federal courts), "There is in the Confederate Con-
stitution no delegation of power, express or implied, to grant individual
citizens irrevocable exemption from military service." (Note: the Con-
federate Constitution in this regard was very similar to the United States
Constitution; see Confed. Const. (1861) Art. I, sec. 8, Cl. 12-17.)
36. For additional holdings the same way in naturalization cases, see
United States v. Bland (1931) 283 U. S. 636 (registered nurse who had
1942] NOTES
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II. Student Cases
In addition to the above naturalization cases the student R. 0.
T. C. cases may be mentioned. Hamilton v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California3 decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States, followed an earlier state case, University of Mary-
land v. Coale,83 decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Both cases are essentially alike, and a discussion of the Hamilton
case will suffice for illustration. In the Hamilton case theological
students of the Methodist Episcopal faith, who were conscien-
tiously opposed to war, attempted to gain admission to the Uni-
versity of California without being required to take the military
training which was compulsory for all male students, under an
order of the Board of Regents of the University. The regents
were acting in compliance with an act of Congress requiring
military training in land-grant colleges.39 The students claimed
that this requirement abridged their privileges and immunities
as citizens of the United States under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and also that it violated Article I of the Kellogg-Briand
Treaty, 0 which said, "The High Contracting Parties solemnly
declare in the names of their respective peoples that they con-
demn recourse to war for the solution of international contro-
versies * * *." The court decided that the privileges and immuni-
ties of these students were not abridged, because
Government, federal and state, each in its own sphere owes
a duty to the people within its jurisdiction to preserve itself
in adequate strength to maintain peace and order and to as-
sure the just enforcement of law. And every citizen owes
the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity, to support
and defend the government against all enemies.41 [Italics
ours.]
The alleged violation of the Treaty was briefly dismissed as of
no merit. This dismissal has been criticized,'4 2 but it is possible
spent nine months in France nursing wounded soldiers); In re Roeper
(D. C. D. Del. 1921) 274 Fed. 490 (court said an alien with conscientious
scruples against bearing arms could not take the oath of allegiance without
mental reservations); Clarke's Case (1930) 301 Pa. 321, 152 Atl. 92 (peti-
tioner wished to qualify the oath of allegiance, to obey the laws of this
country "so far as they are in accord with the moral law of Jesus Christ").
37. (1934) 293 U. S. 245.
38. (1933) 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54. The student was denied admission.
39. (1862) 12 Stat. 503, c. 130, sec. 4.
40. (1928) 46 Stat. 2343.
41. 293 U. S. 245, 262, 263.
42. Irion, The Legal Status of the Conscientious Objector (1939) 8 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 125, 127.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/8
that the Court could have decided that this was a political matter
and not open to judicial review.
III. Conscription Cases
The conscription cases are not as excellent in illustrating the
judicial attitude toward conscientious objectors as the naturaliza-
tion and student cases. Most of these conscription cases turn on
procedural points, or other technicalities of the law.
In the early Massachusetts case of Lees v. Chids 3 the question
of conformity with a statute"l providing exemption for members
of the Quaker Church was the deciding factor. The statute re-
quired the statement that the individual "is conscientiously scru-
pulous of bearing arms," before exemption could be granted. The
applicant omitted these words in the application, merely certify-
ing that he was a member of the Quaker Church and frequently
and usually attended. It was signed by certain prescribed re-
ligious officials, who undoubtedly knew the purpose to which it
was to be put. The court required him to pay the fine for non-
attendance at musters because the omission indicated he might
not have conscientious scruples against war. Under the same
statute a certificate was filed by another Quaker, but he failed
to state that he was a "member" and "frequently and usually"
attended, merely stating that he attended. This was held, in
Commonwealth v. Fletcher,4 to be an insufficient compliance with
the statute.
In those two cases the Massachusetts court seems to have been
just a little wary in dealing with conscientious objectors. Merely
the fact that a man was a Quaker did not, to them, establish,
or even tend to establish, that he disavowed war. They were
careful to point out that many Quakers fought during the Revo-
lutionary War in contravention of the principles of their church.
This fact, it seems, put the court on guard against anyone claim-
ing exemption from militia duty because he was a Quaker.
But in two other cases, decided in different states, there seems
to have been an entirely different approach to the problem. The
Maine court, in Dole v. Allen,"6 allowed a certificate which stated
that the applicant "measurably" conformed to the tenets of the
Quaker Church. The word "measurably" was held to be a sub-
stantial compliance with the statute, and judgment was given
accordingly. And in White and Voorhies v. M'Bride 7 decided
43. (1821) 17 Mass. 351.
44. Mass. Stat. 1809, c. 108, sec. 2.
45. (1815) 12 Mass. 441.
46. (1827) 4 Me. 527.
47. (1815) 4 Bibb. (7 Ky.) 61.
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in Kentucky in 1815, the court seems to have adjudicated com-
pletely the rights of the conscientious objector. The Constitu-
tion of Kentucky allowed exemption from militia duty to all who
had religious scruples against war. Fines assessed by a court
martial for failure to attend musters could not be collected under
the court's decision, because plaintiffs proved themselves to be
members of the Friends Church. This case is completely out of
line.
There are no cases involving conscientious objectors arising
under the United States conscription act during the Civil War,
since it made no provision for them. The Confederate States,
however, did make such provision.48 In Ex parte Stringer,4 a
case arising under the Confederate statute allowing exemption
to members of certain religious sects, the court refused to exempt
petitioner from military duty. The exact nature of petitioner's
claim cannot be gleaned from the opinion, although he seems to
have had conscientious scruples against war, but did not belong
to one of the sects mentioned in the act. The court denied ex-
emption to him, but in doing so makes this curious remark:
Conscientious scruples against bearing arms, unless the
party entertaining them belong to one of the religious sects
mentioned in the statute presents to the courts of the coun-
try no legal ground for declaring the petitioner exempt from
military duty.
If the court meant what it said here, this proposition might indi-
cate that there could be a judicial determination of the exemp-
tion if the applicant made out a claim that he did belong to one
of the sects. This view could be criticized, but a companion case
decided by the same court, Ex parte Hill,0 clearly indicates the
court's attitude toward this matter. There it was said that courts
have no authority to inquire as to whether or not a person was
legally liable to conscription, since the question of amenability to
conscription is in the hands of authority established by the legis-
lature, and the problem is outside the jurisdiction of courts so
long as within the scope of the authority exercised. This is the
modern view.
In Franke v. Murray,51 where petitioner sought habeas corpus
to free him as a prisoner of the army, on the ground that he
was a conscientious objector within the provisions of the Selec-
48. Supra, notes 22 and 23.
49. (1863) 38 Ala. 457.
50. (1863) 38 Ala. 429.
51. (C. C. A. 8, 1918) 248 Fed. 865.
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tive Service Act of 1917,52 the court denied the writ. Here was
a clear statement of the present judicial attitude toward the prob-
lem. The court said,
The claim of appellant that he is a member of a well-recog-
nized religious sect or organization, whose creed and princi-
ples forbid the members participating in war in any form
* * * was a question to be determined under the act of Con-
gress, first by the local board, and upon appeal by the district
board. That provisions of this nature constitute due process
of law, under the constitutional guaranty, has been fre-
quently and uniformly held. [Citing cases.] It is only when
the action of such a board was without jurisdiction, or if,
having jurisdiction, it failed to give the party complaining
a fair opportunity to be heard and present his evidence, that
the action of such a tribunal is subject to review by the
courts.5 8
This case would be followed at the present time.
A search of the authorities has revealed no cases decided on
this point under the present conscription act.
The "judicial rights" of a conscientious objector may be
summed up thus: In any political organization, there are two
opposing interests, the interest of the individual, or citizen, and
the interest of the community, or state. The individual has cer-
tain privileges, which in a democracy may be crystallized into
what we call "rights," among which may be listed the right of
freedom of religion. In addition the individual may have duties,
of which the duty to bear arms when called upon is an example.
On the other hand the community has certain powers, and among
these is the war power. As a corollary of the war power the
community has the power of conscription. It is at this point
that the interest of the individual and the interest of the com-
munity meet, with the individual accepting his duty to bear arms
and the community requiring him to do so. At the point where
the state requires all citizens to perform their duty of bearing
arms, certain considerations enter into the problem. The first
is the interest of the state, which for its own benefit does not
want certain citizens to perform this duty. For example, exemp-
52. 40 Stat. 76, c. 15, sec. 4.
58. 248 Fed. 865, 869.
54. For a discussion of the terminology here, see Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays
(1920); Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141;
Hoebel, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive
Law (1942) 51 Yale L. J. 951.
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tion is granted to workers in occupations vital to the war effort
because they will better serve that effort there than in the
trenches. And again citizens below a certain physical standard
are not desired by the state for a similar reason. On the other
hand the citizen has certain privileges granted to him by the
state; among these is exemption from military service because of
conscientious objection to war. However, all these exemptions
are merely privileges which are granted by the state." The un-
derlying fact remains that it is the duty of every citizen to bear
arms when called upon to do so. It is for these reasons that the
courts are loath to consider the claim of a citizen who asserts
a "right" to exemption.
CONCLUSION
While there may have been a time when the conscientious ob-
jector was given an opportunity to be heard in judicial tribunals,
at the present time those tribunals will listen to only two pleas:
1) lack of jurisdiction; 2) lack of fair hearing. The present at-
titude toward the problem is that the opportunity to be heard
occurs in an administrative tribunal set up by the only authority
having the power to grant the exemption, namely, the legisla-
ture, and that if the application is denied in that tribunal the
courts have no business disturbing its decision. The harshness
of that attitude may depend upon how one views the subject of
conscientious objection. If one is friendly to such a belief the
judicial attitude may seem violative of due process; if unfriendly
the attitude may well be regarded as just.56
Whether the guarantee of freedom of religion in the First
Amendment, which was interpreted by Jefferson as including
freedom of concience, requires Congress to make some provision
for conscientious objectors is a moot question. Certainly as the
provisions stand today the courts would not allow a claim of
denial of the right to freedom of religion. But considering the
part some of the various religious organizations which condemn
55. See note 35, supra.
56. Some of the reluctance of the courts to accept conscientious objectors
may be due to the influence of the Espionage Cases of the last War. Many
of these involved conscientious objectors who violated the terms of the
Espionage Act [(1917) 40 Stat. 217, c. 30) by attempting to incite insur-
rection in the armed forces. The leading case was Schenk v. United States(1918) 249 U. S. 47, where opposition leaflets to the draft were held not
protected by the guaranty of freedom of speech in the Constitution, be-
cause of the state of war which existed. Justice Holmes, in his dissent in
the case of United States v. Schwimmer (1929) 279 U. S. 644, pointed out
that the majority were influenced by a fear that Mrs. Schwimmer would be
another Schenck.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/8
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war, such as the Society of Friends, have played in our history
since the Revolution, it is doubtful that Congress would ever
recede to a position where a member of a religious organization
with convictions against war would be unable to obtain exemp-
tion from military service.
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